This translation of selections from the De universo grew out of a graduate seminar on William of Auvergne held at Marquette University in 1995. It translates and annotates large parts of the De universo and of the De anima.

Wide-ranging essays making up the first major study of Nietzsche and the classical tradition in a quarter of a century. This volume collects a wide-ranging set of essays examining Friedrich Nietzsche's engagement with antiquity in all its aspects. It investigates Nietzsche's reaction and response to the concept of "classicism," with particular reference to his work on Greek culture as a philologist in Basel and later as a philosopher of modernity, and to his reception of German classicism in all his texts. (...) The book should be of interest to students of ancient history and classics, philosophy, comparative literature, and Germanistik. Taken together, these papers suggest that classicism is both a more significant, and a more contested, concept for Nietzsche than is often realized, and it demonstratesthe need for a return to a close attention to the intellectual-historical context in terms of which Nietzsche saw himself operating. An awareness of the rich variety of academic backgrounds, methodologies, and techniques of reading evinced in these chapters is perhaps the only way for the contemporary scholar to come to grips with what classicism meant for Nietzsche, and hence what Nietzsche means for us today. The book is divided into five sections -- The Classical Greeks; Pre-Socratics and Pythagoreans, Cynics and Stoics; Nietzsche and the Platonic Tradition; Contestations; and German Classicism -- and constitutes the first major study of Nietzsche and the classical tradition in a quarter of a century. Contributors: Jessica N. Berry, Benjamin Biebuyck, Danny Praet and Isabelle Vanden Poel, Paul Bishop, R. Bracht Branham, Thomas Brobjer, David Campbell, Alan Cardew, Roy Elveton, Christian Emden, Simon Gillham, John Hamilton, Mark Hammond, Albert Henrichs, Dirk t.D. Held, David F. Horkott, Dylan Jaggard, Fiona Jenkins, Anthony K. Jensen, Laurence Lampert, Nicholas Martin, Thomas A. Meyer, Burkhard Meyer-Sickendiek, John S. Moore, Neville Morley, David N. McNeill, James I. Porter, Martin A. Ruehl, Herman Siemens, Barry Stocker, Friedrich Ulfers and Mark Daniel Cohen, and Peter Yates. Paul Bishop is William Jacks Chair of Modern Languages at the University of Glasgow. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Ho, Ho, History Arius and Theological Controversy The Council of Nicaea – a Jolly Occasion Float like an Acolyte, Sting like the See Does Theology Really Matter? Here Comes Santa Claus – into the Twenty‐First Century The Nicholas of History and the Santa of Faith?

Hermeneutics, the Bible and Literary Criticism. Edited by Ann Loades and Michael McLain.The Craft of Theology: From Symbol to System. By Avery Dulles.The Shape of Soreriology. By John McIntyre.Not the Cross But the Crucfied. By H.‐E. Mertens.Verbum Curo: An Encyclopedia on Jesus, the Christ. By Michael O'Carroll.The Search for the Origins of Christian Worship: Sources and Methods for the Study of the Early Liturgy. By Paul Bradshaw.Worship: Initiation and the Churches. By Leonel L. Mitchell.The Eucharistic Mystery: Revitalizing the Tradition. By (...) David Power.Church of Churches: The Ecclesiology of Communion. By J.‐M. Tillard.God and History, Aspects of British Theology 1875‐1914. By Peter Hinchliff.Clear Heads and Holy Hearts: The Religious and Theological Ideal of John Henry Newman. By Terrence Merrigan.The Desert Fathers on Monastic Community. By Graham Gould.John Moschos, ‘The Spiritual Meadow’. Introduction, translation and notes by John Wortley.A Gentle Touch. By David Pailin.The Eye of the Storm: Spiritual Resources for rhe Pursuit of Justice. By Kenneth Leech.The Church and the Arts. Edited by Diana Wood.Anti‐Christian Polemic in Early Islam: Abu Isa al‐Warraq's ‘Against the Trinity’. Edited by David Thomas.Bernardus Magister: Papers Presented at the Nonacentenary Celebration of the Birth of St Bernard of Clairvaux. Edited by John R. Sommerfeldt.Church and City 1000‐1500: Essays in Honour of Christopher Brooke. Edited by David Abulafia, Michael Franklin and Miri Rubin.‘Piers Plowman’ and the Problem of Belief. By Britton J. Harwood.Ignutius of Luyola: The Psychology of a Saint. By W. W. Meissner.Jerome Naahl, S. J., 1507‐1580: Tracking the First Generation of Jesuits. By William V. Bangert, edited and completed by Thomas M. McCoog.From Bishop to Witch: The System of the Sacred in Early Modern Terra d'Otranto. By David Gentilcore.Civic Politics in the Rome of Urban VIII. By Laurie Nussdorfer.Michel de Montaigne: The Complete Essays. Translated by M. A. Screech.Montaigne and Melancholy: The Wisdom of the ‘Essays’. By M. A. Screech.Religion and Philosophy. Edited by Martin Warner.What is Faith? Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. By Anthony Kenny.Truth and Hisroriciry. By Richard Campbell. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"A Unity of Order":Aquinas on the End of PoliticsWilliam McCormick S.J.Nonspecialists are often surprised to learn that Aquinas's thought on Church and state is a matter of obscurity. After all, Aquinas is the most famous medieval thinker in the West, and the question of Church and state is one of the best-known medieval political questions. And yet his thought on that polemical topic remains obscure. As John Watt puts (...) it: "There are too many ambiguities in his doctrine and too many unanswerable questions about what he did or did not hold."1Why is his view not better understood? Part of its obscurity is the relative infrequency with which he writes on politics.2 Another is the relative lack of interest in medieval political thought among political scientists and historians of political thought, an obscurity dating back to the Renaissance.3 Those who do study Aquinas's thought, moreover, have been mired in a controversy over two key texts: one from book II of his Scriptum or commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences (d. 44, q. 2, a. 3, exp. text.), and the other in book II of De regno (On kingship), chapter 3 (no. 110). For brevity, I will use S for the Scriptum passage and R for the De regno passage.4 These two [End Page 1019] appear to contradict each other, and with respect to fundamental political questions. The debate over these two texts points to what most contributes to the obscurity of Aquinas's teaching on Church and state: confusion about his vision of politics in human life. As I will show in this paper, Aquinas transcends modern categories of the "secular" and "belief" in his treatment of politics. Aquinas valorizes the integrity of political activity: that autonomy is not just a concession to the modern condition. It is in fact when Aquinas is most theological that he is most open to that integrity. The integrity of the political speaks to the intrinsic goodness of that order: it mirrors God's unity in its complex and ordered diversity.In this paper I examine R and S to show their concordance. I argue that they are complementary in what they prescribe for relations between Church and state, and indeed grounded in the same account of the origins of political authority. Through this investigation we will uncover key principles of Aquinas's political thinking that show him to have a capacious vision of politics where humans achieve the actualization of their full beings as human.A key notion will be unitas ordinis, or unity of order: the form of human cooperation in political life. As we will see, that form strikes a middle path between the simple unity of the individual person and the orderless collectivity of a crowd. For Aquinas, that order is itself a common good of politics, and an intrinsic one at that, before any "extrinsic" common good achieved by the people through that order. Part of why this seemingly secular consideration is good is its theological importance: it mirrors God.Further, if Aquinas does not elaborate on political arrangements as much as one would like, nevertheless he offers sure guidance for the principles which ought to guide the prudent development of those arrangements in a particular time and place. Ultimately Aquinas shows that medieval political thought is in key respects not as alien and hostile to us as we might imagine, but in its own way equally concerned about the integrity of the political life.5The Teaching of SAquinas's teaching on Church and state in S is widely accepted as his mature "two powers" teaching. Aquinas's most famous work, the Summa theologiae [ST], would eventually replace Lombard's Sentences, but in Thomas's own thirteenth century it was that compendium of quotations and arguments [End Page 1020] from Christian sources compiled by the twelfth-century theologian-bishop Lombard that was the standard theology textbook in the Latin West—the Ur-text for theological teaching and scholarship.6The Sentences is perhaps the most important Western book no one has heard of. It was so influential not only because it collected a rich trove of... (shrink)

The Hutchinsonian movement exercised considerable influence on thought about various topics of importance in England's Enlightenment/Counter-Enlightenment debates. Its epistemological stance, derived from a group of Irish writers of the early eighteenth century, places the movement at the centre of these debates and does much to explain its attraction to contemporaries. The article emphasises the persistence of Hutchinsonian thought and the continuing importance of its epistemological underpinnings into the early nineteenth century, drawing attention particularly to the writings of Bishop (...) class='Hi'>William Van Mildert. (shrink)

Sosa’s topic is the use of intuitions in philosophy. Much of what I have written on the issue has been critical of appeals to intuition in epistemology, though in recent years I have become increasingly skeptical of the use of intuitions in ethics and in semantic theory as well.

This study is an unusual contribution to the philosophy of mind in that it argues for the sometimes unfashionable view of dualism: that mind and matter are distinct and separate entities as Descartes believed. The author takes as his point of departure the imaginative hypothesis of disembodiment, which establishes the possibility of the mind's being a quite non-material thing. There are clear casual correlations between what is physical and what is mental, and the most serious issue confronting dualism since Descartes (...) has been how such an interaction is possible. Dr Hart sets out to answer this question by showing that the issue is as much about the nature of causation as it is about the natures of mind and matter. (shrink)

In Natural Ethical Facts William Casebeer argues that we can articulate a fully naturalized ethical theory using concepts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science, and that we can study moral cognition just as we study other forms of cognition. His goal is to show that we have "softly fixed" human natures, that these natures are evolved, and that our lives go well or badly depending on how we satisfy the functional demands of these natures. Natural Ethical Facts is a (...) comprehensive examination of what a plausible moral science would look like.Casebeer begins by discussing the nature of ethics and the possible relationship between science and ethics. He then addresses David Hume's naturalistic fallacy and G. E. Moore's open-question argument, drawing on the work of John Dewey and W. V. O. Quine. He then proposes a functional account of ethics, offering corresponding biological and moral descriptions. Discussing in detail the neural correlates of moral cognition, he argues that neural networks can be used to model ethical function. He then discusses the impact his views of moral epistemology and ontology will have on traditional ethical theory and moral education, concluding that there is room for other moral theories as long as they take into consideration the functional aspect of ethics; the pragmatic neo-Aristotelian virtue theory he proposes thus serves as a moral "big tent." Finally, he addresses objections to ethical naturalism that may arise, and calls for a reconciliation of the sciences and the humanities. "Living well," Casebeer writes, "depends upon reweaving our ethical theories into the warp and woof of our scientific heritage, attending to the myriad consequences such a project will have for the way we live our lives and the manner in which we structure our collective moral institutions.". (shrink)

There are a wide range of positions regarding the ontological nature of computer hardware and software. Moor [The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (1978), 213–222] argues that there...

Discriminating behavior depends on neural representations in which the sensory activity patterns guiding different responses are decorrelated from one another. Visual information can often be parsimoniously transformed into these behavioral bridge-locus representations within neuro-computational visuo-spatial maps. Isomorphic inverse-optical world representation is not the goal. Nevertheless, such useful transformations can involve neural filling-in. Such a subpersonal representation of information is consistent with personal-level vision theory.

Although Hegel is generally understood as a thinker of modernity, this volume argues that his modernity can only be understood in essential relation to classical antiquity. It explores his readings of the ancient Graeco-Roman world in each of the major areas of his historical thinking in turn, from politics and art to history itself.

The dissertation is a detailed philosophical interpretation of the entire text of Plato's Sophist. In addition to extended analysis of the argument and discussion of many current interpretations, special attention is given to the following themes as they occur in other Platonic dialogues as well as the Sophist: ; Plato's theory of Knowledge: What is it that can be known? And how does one get to know it? Do the Sophist and other late dialogues show a change in Plato's views, (...) or an elaboration of views he held when he wrote such works as the Phaedo and the Republic? ;: these fall into three types: those with propositional structures, those which are structured like descriptions, i.e. denoting complexes, and definitions, which are denoting complexes of a special sort. Each of these types is discussed, and the role of definitions in Plato's theory of knowledge is explained. ; Judgments: what is a judgment, or opinion? How does a judgment come to be made? Plato distinguished questions about the internal structure of judgments or opinions from questions about what is involved in a person's coming to judge, or believe, or opine something. Both sorts of questions are discussed in the dissertation. ; Truth and falsity: two notions of truth, together with corresponding notions of falsity, are distinguished. One is a notion of truth as predicated of propositionally structured simpliciter. This is the notion which plays a dominate role in the Sophist. The other notion, which rears its head in the Cratylus and a short section of the Phaedrus, if a notion of true of as predicted of names and and what they are said of. Both notions, and other notions of truth held by Plato's philosophical opponents, are explained and discussed. ; Negation: What is the problem about being and not being^which arises in the Sophist? How is it related to the problem raised^as to how false judgments and are possible? Plato believed^that Parmenides made a mistaken assumption about negation, and^that that assumption could be used by sophists such as Protagoras^and Gorgias to undermine the thesis that mistaken judgments and^false occur. The central pages of the Sophist are devoted to^uncovering Parmenides' error, and to offering a replacement for the^assumption which Plato rejects. Plato then shows how the replacement he suggests can beused in an analysis of true and false and judgments. ;Numerous other themes arise in the course of the analysis of the argument--Plato's notions of time and change, of images, of explanation, etc. These, too, are discussed. There are twenty one appendices containing discussions of points of translation, alternative interpretations of key passages, formal proofs not appropriate for inclusion in the main body of the text and too extended for footnotes, and remarks on various passages occurring in other Platonic dialogues helpful in glossing the Sophist. (shrink)

Physiological studies show that the driving force for long distance transport and the control of nutrient movement in plants resides largely in the regulated, membrane transport of a few carbohydrates, principally sucrose. The evidence is reviewed here and biochemical studies on sucrose carrier proteins are discussed.

In the fall of 1869, the first of eight students set off from the tiny Sadowara Domain in southeastern Kyushu to pursue study in America and Europe. Overshadowed by more famous peers from other domains, the Sadowara students have been all but forgotten, and their lives abroad remain an untold story. Yet they played an important role in the early development of Japanese studies in the United States. Enrolling at diverse institutions mostly in the Northeast, six of the students came (...) to form a close relationship with Yale’s university librarian, a philologist named Addison Van Name. Inspired by his new friends to study the Japanese language, within a year Van Name was offering America’s first college course in Japanese, and he quickly began to produce scholarship on Japan and its language, literature, and history. By the mid-1870s, the Sadowara students had returned to their home country, where their subsequent careers constituted a microcosm of the paradox and transformation of the early Meiji period. Van Name maintained contact with his Japanese friends, and through this long-distance relationship succeeded in building America’s first significant Japanese library collection: a 3,000-volume collection of Edo and early Meiji titles that still survives today. (shrink)

The developing neuromuscular junction has provided an important paradigm for studying synapse formation. An outstanding feature of neuromuscular differentiation is the aggregation of acetylcholine receptors (AChRs) at high density in the postsynaptic membrane. While AChR aggregation is generally believed to be induced by the nerve, the mechanisms underlying aggregation remain to be clarified. A 43‐kD protein (43k) normally associated with the cytoplasmic aspect of AChR clusters has long been suspected of immobilizing AChRs by linking them to the cytoskeleton. In recent (...) studies, the AChR clustering activity of 43k has, at last, been demonstrated by expressing recombinant AChR and 43k in non‐muscle cells. Mutagenesis of 43k has revealed distinct domains within the primary structure which may be responsible for plasma membrane targeting and AChR binding. Other lines of study have provided clues as to how nerve‐derived (extracellular) AChR‐cluster inducing factors such as agrin might activate 43k‐driven postsynaptic membrane specialization. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Analyzing How Rhetoric is Epistemic”:A Reply to Steve FullerWilliam D. HarpineMy point in "What Do You Mean, Rhetoric Is Epistemic" (Harpine 2004) is that unclear and inconsistent use of terms has hindered previous research on the idea that rhetoric is epistemic. I propose to clarify definitions to alleviate this problem and encourage further research into how rhetoric might be epistemic. Professor Fuller's viewpoint is that definitions are inherently problematic, (...) and that my call for rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists to formulate their definitions more carefully would hold rhetorical theory to "illusory" standards (Fuller 2005, 72). However, I feel that his criticism of definitions overstates what his arguments demonstrate. Fuller (2005) also expresses doubts about the concept of certainty, doubts which echo points in my essay. Along the way, he offers an interesting line of reasoning that might advance the dialogue in the way that I had hoped. To an extent, Fuller seems to reach similar conclusions about the relationship between rhetoric and knowledge, albeit by a different route.CertaintyMy essay argues that certain claims of rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists trade on an equivocation about the meaning of "certainty." The word "certain" can carry an objective meaning: "It is certain that I will have to pay taxes," or it can be subjective: "I feel certain that I will have to pay taxes." An ordinary person can easily see that the two claims mean something different. Although Wittgenstein explains this distinction most clearly, in a statement that Fuller (2005) himself quotes, the distinction routinely arises in everyday discourse. An argument that works surreptitiously by sliding from one of these meanings to the other commits the fallacy of equivocation. The rhetoric-is-epistemic literature does exactly that all too often. [End Page 82]On this matter, expressing doubts about objective certainty, Fuller comments that the role of certainty in philosophy is inconclusive (2005, 78). I fully agree with this point. My argument is to show how rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists fallaciously rely on an ambiguity in meaning, not to claim that some things really are objectively certain. It is not the purpose of rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists to argue that nothing is certain—there are much more straightforward ways to do that—but to show that rhetoric has an epistemic role. To accomplish this, they need an argument that does not short-circuit by equivocating in the use of key terms. In any case, my essay notes that "the current philosophical literature has not taken a strong stance in favor of requiring knowledge to be either objectively or subjectively certain," which resembles Fuller's own conclusion, and also that rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists "should dispense with the issue of certainty" (Harpine 2004, 346), which, if Fuller agrees (as I suspect he does), renders further details moot.KnowledgeMost rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists work either explicitly or implicitly with the traditional definition that knowledge is justified true belief. They point out that rhetoric offers justification. Gettier's argument shows that the traditional definition fails to capture the meaning of "knowledge." Thus, the rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists have a problem tying their theory to their conception of knowledge. The point is not that different rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists have used different definitions of knowledge, but rather that they work with an inadequate definition. Fuller agrees with Gettier's point, gives additional arguments on its behalf, and offers an interesting discussion of the rhetorical implications of Gettier's argument. Since Gettier's argument may lead one to question whether justification is a defining quality of knowledge, rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists might look for other kinds of linkages between rhetoric and knowledge. The concluding portions of my essay suggest several such possible linkages.1Does my argument resemble the Babel thesis? Elsewhere, Fuller (2002, 104) explains the Babel thesis as the claim that disagreements are due to different meanings, not to different beliefs. One must agree with Fuller that the Babel thesis overstates the importance of meaning. However, a similar insight arises in more modest guise as Davidson's principle [End Page 83] of charity. Studying intercultural relationships, Davidson (1984, 136) suggests that when we encounter people whose beliefs differ from ours, we... (shrink)

The present paper defends the thesis that Spenser's recovery of place, as enacted in 'The Faerie Queene,' Book VI, can be linked in a direct way to his use of a poetic phenomenology which informs and clarifies his work as an epic writer. Spenser's "Book of Courtesy" enacts a Neo-Platonic movement from the lower levels of temporal existence to an exalted vision of spiritual perfection. The paper explores this movement along phenomenological lines as a mysterious adventure that embraces self and (...) other, personality and community, aesthetics and ethics, in a sequence of images that opens up a new interpretation of imaginative fulfillment. -/- . (shrink)

In a previous article, we challenged the “incentivization view” held by J. P. Smit, Filip Buekens, and Stan du Plessis as failing to cover social phenomena involving strict joint actions. The authors’ response to our criticism seriously misstates our main point. We have therefore, as briefly and sharply as we can, restated the problem in this note.

The logical connection argument holds that factors which appear causally connected can be shown not to be so, At least when described in certain ways, If these factors are logically connected when so described. I argue that normal formulations of the logical connection argument confuse propositions and events. Moreover, When it is clarified in terms of "de re" necessity, It requires strong ontological assumptions for which no support is given and about the intelligibility of which there is reasonable question. I (...) conclude that the logical connection argument fails to give any reason for excluding any causal hypothesis. (shrink)

Readers will gain insight in speaking truth in love, learn to avoid manipulating others, and realize the freedom of saying 'no.'"--Provided by publisher.